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Configurations	of	Film:	Series	Foreword
Scalable across a variety of formats and standardized in view of 
global circulation, the moving image has always been both an 
image of movement and an image on the move. Over the last 
three decades, digital production technologies, communication 
networks and distribution platforms have taken the scalability 
and mobility of film to a new level. Beyond the classical dispositif 
of the cinema, new forms and knowledges of cinema and film 
have emerged, challenging the established approaches to the 
study of film. The conceptual framework of index, dispositif and 
canon, which defined cinema as photochemical image technology 
with a privileged bond to reality, a site of public projection, and a 
set of works from auteurs from specific national origins, can no 
longer account for the current multitude of moving images and 
the trajectories of their global movements. The term “post­cin­
ema condition,” which was first proposed by film theorists more 
than a decade ago to describe the new cultural and technological 
order of moving images, retained an almost melancholic attach­
ment to that which the cinema no longer was. Moving beyond 
such attachments, the concept of “configurations of film” aims 
to account for moving images in terms of their operations, forms 
and formats, locations and infrastructures, expanding the field 
of cinematic knowledges beyond the arts and the aesthetic, while 
retaining a focus on film as privileged site for the production of 
cultural meaning, for social action and for political conflict.
The series “Configurations of Film” presents pointed inter­
ventions in this field of debate by emerging and established 
international scholars associated with the DFG­funded Graduate 
Research Training Program (Graduiertenkolleg) “Konfigurationen 
des Films” at Goethe University Frankfurt. The contributions 
to the series aim to explore and expand our understanding of 
configurations of film in both a contemporary and historical per­
spective, combining film and media theory with media history 
to address key problems in the development of new analytical 
frameworks for the moving image on the move.

On devrait commencer à savoir que ce ne 
sont pas les gens qui communiquent …, mais 
les objets (énoncés, images) qui se com-
muniquent. [We should know by now that it 
is not people who communicate, but rather 
objects (statements, images) that communicate 
by themselves.] 
Serge Daney, “La remise en scène” (1976)1
Introduction
Rebecca Boguska, Vinzenz Hediger 
Is film a medium of communication? 
This is a basic question of film studies. It is about as old as 
the field itself, and the discursive frameworks and underlying 
assumptions that make the question relevant are about as old 
as the medium, or the art form, of cinema itself. As John Durham 
Peters argues, “only since the late nineteenth century have we 
defined ourselves in terms our ability to communicate with one 
another,” to the point where “‘[c]ommunication’ is one of the 
characteristic concepts of the twentieth century” (1999, 1).
For most of the twentieth century up until the 1970s, the question 
of whether film was a medium of communication seemed to have 
been settled in the affirmative. During the Second World War, 
Princeton psychologists Carl Hovland, Arthur Lumsdaine, and 
Fred Sheffield studied the effects of the US Army’s “Why we fight” 
films, which Frank Capra produced, on the motivations and polit­
ical persuasions of US soldiers. As a matter of course, the three 
researchers assumed that film, like radio or the newspaper, was 
1 For the pointer, we thank Pierre Eugène.
8 a form of mass communication. When they published the study 
as a book in 1949, Princeton University Press chose Experiments 
on Mass Communication as the title. “Film” does not even appear 
in the subtitle. With almost continuous reprints since its first pub­
lication, it remains one of the founding texts of empirical media 
research. Incidentally, the study showed that soldiers learned 
a lot about the reasons and historical contexts of the war, but 
emerged from contact with the films with their belief structures 
and political convictions largely unaffected. What Hovland, Lums­
daine, and Sheffield found was—at least in part—a failure of film 
to communicate (2017).
One could argue, of course, that this partial failure underscores 
film’s standing as a modern, twentieth­century medium and 
art form. Citing the films of Bergman, Antonioni, and Tarkovsky, 
and “scenes of stammering face­to­face relations” alongside the 
dramatic works of Beckett, Sartre, and Ionesco, Peters reminds us 
that “much twentieth­century drama, art, cinema, and literature 
examines the impossibility of communication between people” 
(Peteres 1999, 2). And the preoccupation with the absence of 
communication extends beyond the arts into the social sciences 
and social theory. Probably more in the same modernist spirit 
than is generally acknowledged, Niklas Luhmann’s theory of 
social systems is predicated on the improbability, rather than the 
inevitability of communication (1995). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when film studies emerged as 
an academic field, Christian Metz addressed the question of film 
as a medium of communication along similar lines. For Metz, film 
was not quite a medium of communication, or rather, it was more 
than that. Writing as a linguist turned film theorist, Metz shifted 
the framework from communication research to semiotics and 
argued: 
A cinema is not a system, but contains several of them. It 
seems not to have signs, but this is because its own are very 
different from those of spoken language; in addition, the 
9domain of signification largely goes beyond that of signs …. 
It goes beyond that of communication strictly speaking: the 
cinema, it is true, does not authorize the immediate play of 
bilateral exchange, but it is not the only semiotic system to 
behave in this way; nothing directly responds to a myth, to 
a folktale, to a ritual, to a culinary or clothing system, to a 
piece of music. (Metz 1974, 288)
Cinema, in other words, is more a resource of cultural meanings 
than a medium of communication, if indeed by communication 
we understand primarily face­to­face communication, the “imme­
diate play of bilateral exchange” of which Metz speaks here. 
For cinema studies as a field of research, Metz’s shift, from a 
communications to a semiotics framework and from “bilateral 
exchange” to cinema as a resource of meaning embedded in 
social practice, is a paradigmatic gesture. It secures a surplus of 
meaning for cinema, for which communication as a heuristics 
cannot sufficiently account. It further indicates that a new field, 
and new methodologies, are required instead. With its rigor 
derived from linguistics, semiotics was a methodology that could 
supplant the empirical research methods of communication 
studies. And while film semiotics has not been the dominant 
approach to the study of film for about a quarter of a century 
now, the legacy of Metz’s shift away from the model of com­
munication has endured. Since Metz first disputed film’s status 
as a medium of communication, all successive and competing 
paradigms in film theory, from cognitive film theory to Deleuzian 
and phenomenological and other philosophical approaches, 
have approached film as an aesthetic object rather than an act of 
communication. 
So why return to the question of film as communication now, as 
John Mowitt does in this essay? 
One answer to this question can be given from a film studies 
point of view. 
10 It has been argued that film studies emerged as a field of 
research by defining its object through the triad of canon, 
index, and dispositif—i.e. “cinema” understood as a catalogue of 
ultimately single­authored masterpieces worthy of hermeneutic 
effort, created in a technical medium based on photochemical 
reproduction, put on display in a social situation in which tech­
nology contributes to and structures the creation of salient forms 
of experience and subjectivity. Within the framework of this 
triad of canon, index, and dispositif, Metz’s shift ensured that the 
focus remained on the nexus of technology, aesthetics, and sub­
jectivity, rather than focusing on a purported “bilateral exchange” 
between producers and audience.
The research hypothesis of “Configurations of Film,” a research 
collective comprised of twelve doctoral students and two post­
docs per cohort working closely with a group of fifteen estab­
lished scholars, is that all three elements of this tripartite defi­
nition of cinema—the canon, the index, and the dispositif—have 
been in crisis, or at least undergoing a process of transformation, 
for some time now. The canon of cinephilia has been vastly 
expanded, and even exploded, by the emergence of new film 
industries across the world and particularly by the rise of South 
and East Asian cinemas and popular film industries in Africa over 
the last decades. Film in a broader sense is now largely a digital 
and no longer a photochemical medium, even if the roughly two 
thousand 35mm cameras still in existence worldwide continue to 
be used in feature film production.2 In Africa, the entire output 
of the various film industries, including the Nigerian English­lan­
guage production known as “Nollywood,” has been on VHS and 
later digital video for a quarter of a century now. Film distribution 
has entirely transitioned to digital formats. And the classical dis-
positif of cinema has ceded its primacy to a variety of platforms 
and contexts in which moving images address and find viewers. 
2 Personal communication with Ueli Staiger, director of photography, August 
1, 2017.
11For more than a decade, film theory has been accounting for 
this tripartite crisis of the canon, the index, and the dispositif 
under the rubric of a “post­cinema” and the “post­cinema con­
dition.” Terms such as post­cinema or post­media (Casetti 2011; 
Krauss 1999) had been extremely productive for thinking about 
film beyond cinema. However, the case can be made that we 
have reached a point where the concept of “post­cinema” has 
exhausted its potential as a heuristic. More specifically, the 
problem with the term “post­cinema” is twofold. It explains the 
transformation of cinema in terms of what cinema was, but 
has ceased to be, or no longer predominately is. It prescribes 
a sense of “oldness” and “newness” and describes the new in 
terms of the old. And it makes the crisis permanent, thereby 
delaying the development of new conceptual tools to account 
for moving image technologies, practices, and cultures beyond 
the classical cinema paradigm. Against this backdrop, to speak of 
configurations of film is a move that is designed to re­open the 
field of inquiry and move towards new conceptual tools beyond 
the “post­cinema” framework (De Rosa and Hediger 2017). Rather 
than reproduce established binaries, “Configurations of Film” 
is interested in instability as an inherent quality of film, in film’s 
shifting formations, usages, and localizations. 
To reopen the question of communication could be seen as 
part of a heuristic which calls into question all elements of the 
established definitions of the object “cinema.” Classical cinema 
could plausibly be defined as a form of unidirectional one­to­
many communication, i.e. a “mass medium,” which was the 
(implicit) working definition of Holvand, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield. 
Contemporary moving image practices, on the other hand, 
include the “phone films” first studied by scholars such as Roger 
Odin (2011) or the “films poucette,” films made with digital devices 
by children, first studied by Alexandra Schneider and Wanda 
Strauven (2017), as well as other uses of digital image technology, 
including short film recordings in video messaging and social 
networks. The introduction of the smart phone in particular has 
12 dramatically reduced the marginal costs of producing a moving 
image. Film and video have become a substitute for the letter 
or the message left on a phone answering machine, and apps 
such as FaceTime have turned video into a medium for “bilateral 
exchange” after all. 
One can of course limit the scope of inquiry to artistic practices 
alone and remove such uses of moving­image technologies from 
consideration, or leave their study to communication studies. But 
this would mean to needlessly curtail film studies’ understanding 
of contemporary moving­image culture. In that sense, a renewed 
debate about film as communication is not only a welcome, but a 
necessary item on the research agenda. 
John Mowitt’s point of the departure in Tracks from the Crypt is 
precisely that “communication is that to which we now have ready 
access” (24). However, his interest is not to reinsert film within 
a communication studies framework, nor does he develop a new 
theory of film as communication based on an analysis of the 
new modes of moving­image use. That book has been written by 
Roger Odin. In The Spaces of Communication, Odin turns Metz’s 
gesture around and draws on his work on home movies to offer a 
critique of, and an alternative to, the established “one­to­many” 
models of mass communication studies from a film studies point 
of view (2020). By contrast, John Mowitt turns to the cinema in a 
more classical sense to address the question of communication. 
In Tracks from the Crypt, Mowitt focuses on “moments in the 
medium of the cinema where that medium communicates 
about itself as a medium of communication” (25). If modernist 
cinema—the cinema of Antonioni, Bergman, or Tarkovsky—dra­
matizes its characters’ inability to communicate, one can indeed 
argue that cinema also dramatizes, or communicates about, its 
own ability, and inability, to communicate. How does cinema 
communicate? How does cinema fail to communicate? How does 
cinema communicate about communication? These are the three 
13questions Mowitt asks to circumscribe what he proposes to call 
the “drama of … communication” (42). 
To seize the originality of Mowitt’s approach, it is important to 
distinguish the “drama of … communication” from modernist 
strategies of reflexivity or “mise­en­abyme” (Stam 1992). Draw­
ing on a distinction proposed by linguist Emile Benveniste, film 
theorists in the 1970s liked to describe mainstream cinema as 
“histoire,” i.e. a type of narrative presentation that strategically 
erased all traces of enunciation and the basic communicative 
structure of the film­viewer relationship, as opposed to “dis­
cours,” a type of presentation that makes this structure explicit 
(Stam, Burgoyne, and Flitterman­Lewis 1992, 105). On the one 
hand, the avoidance of direct looks into the camera in classical 
Hollywood cinema lent credence to the claim that Hollywood 
films were a case of “histoire.” On the other hand, against the 
backdrop of this binary distinction, any reference to the process 
of enunciation itself—such as a shot that showed the camera in 
a mirror, and even the excessive use of mirrors itself—could be 
construed as a moment of “discours,” a moment of reflexivity 
that liberated the film from the yoke of “histoire.” By contrast, 
Mowitt’s “drama of … communication” is both more unobtrusive 
and more pervasive than moments of reflexivity and temporary 
transitions from “histoire” to “discours.”  
Cross­cutting sequences usually serve to create suspense by 
juxtaposing two simultaneous, but spatially distinct actions, in 
which the action in one section is designed to thwart the action 
in the other. The classic example is the train operator riding to 
the rescue of his distressed romantic interest under siege from 
robbers in Griffith’s pioneering 1911 film The Lonedale Operator, a 
dramatic template which Griffith later infused with racism and 
reprised in The Birth of a Nation (USA 1915), where the Ku Klux Klan 
rides to the rescue of Lillian Gish’s white maiden to save her from 
being raped by a black man. The cross­cutting template in itself 
could be read as a dramatization of film’s ability to communicate, 
at least in the sense of creating a communion between separate 
14 actions through the mind of the spectator. In E.T. the Extra-Ter-
restrial (USA 1982), one of the biggest hits in Hollywood history, 
Spielberg takes this figure one step further by dramatizing 
communication, and more specifically, the mental communion of 
separate actors, in a cross­cutting sequence. Elliott, the boy who 
takes the extraterrestrial into his suburban home and develops 
a special bond with him, goes to school one morning, leaving E.T. 
behind in his bedroom. While Elliott prepares for a biology lesson, 
E.T. leaves the room, moves to the kitchen and opens the fridge. 
He discovers a can of potato salad, which he doesn’t like and 
tosses to the family dog standing next to him. He then discovers a 
can of beer. As the dog barks, ostensibly to warn him, E.T. downs 
the contents of the beer can. The film then cuts to Elliott in the 
classroom, who suddenly and involuntarily burps. Back to E.T., 
now fully drunk, who walks around the kitchen and hits his head 
against the cupboards. Cut to Elliott who mimetically feels his 
pain. As Elliott falls under the table, a blond girl in the back­
ground—Elliott’s romantic interest—starts to notice that some­
thing is wrong. E.T. then turns on the TV and starts to dissemble 
a toy calculator in order to build a device to get in touch with his 
extraterrestrial peers. Elliott has now moved to his biology class, 
where he is about to dissect a frog. Elliott asks the frog: “Say ‘hi’. 
Can you talk? Can you say ‘hi’?” Meanwhile, through the commu­
nion created by cross­cutting he shares the thoughts and feelings 
of E.T. as the latter watches TV and works on his communication 
device. Inspired by one of E.T.’s TV inputs, Elliott decides to set 
the frogs free and creates havoc in the classroom as the animals 
start jumping around and out of the window. As E.T. surfs chan­
nels, he discovers a dramatic scene of a woman trying to leave a 
cabin, but who is held back energetically by the male protagonist, 
who then proceeds to kiss her. Elliott mimetically reenacts this 
moment in the biology classroom, keeping the blond girl from 
earlier in the scene from leaving the room and ultimately kissing 
her, for which he has to step on the back of one of his friends 
because he is one head shorter than his love interest. 
15Spielberg’s scene has obvious echoes of an earlier famous school 
havoc scene, the boarding school rebellion in Jean Vigo’s Zéro de 
conduite (F 1930). But rather than just referencing the Vigo film for 
a small cinephile audience, Spielberg dramatizes the way in which 
cinema communicates with its own past through television for 
all to see. While reprising the modernist concern with communi­
cation failure in E.T.’s and Elliott’s interaction with the dog and 
the frog, the scene is also an exuberant celebration of cinema’s 
power to create a communion of minds, images, and objects—a 
configuration of moving images, and other technologies in a net­
work of communication. As Mowitt argues, we could understand 
the shot­reverse­shot pattern as a machine “allow[ing] speech 
to take place even when it doesn’t” (28). Cross­cutting here is a 
machine that allows not only speech, but various forms of non­
verbal communication, including mimicry and re­enactment, “to 
take place even when it doesn’t.” 
Mowitt’s own examples in the following essay are less exuberant, 
but they cover a wide range of “audiovisual configurations of 
film and video” (23), ranging from Cool Hand Luke (D: Stuart 
Rosenberg, USA 1967), a key theatrical film of the 1960s, to David 
Bowie’s “Lazarus” (D: Johan Renck, USA 2016), a recent music 
video. 
But there is more at stake in Mowitt’s return to the question of 
film as communication than just an affirmation of cinema’s power 
to communicate, and a delimitation of that power. What is at 
stake here is the matter of communication itself, as configured in 
and through cinema. As we already pointed out, for Mowitt, the 
starting point is not the impossibility of communication, but an 
excess of communication. Communication is something “to which 
we now have ready access” (24). This shifts the problem of 
communication to a different location. Mowitt quotes Deleuze: 
So it ’s not a problem of getting people to express themselves 
but of providing little gaps of solitude and silence in which 
they might eventually find something to say.… What we are 
16 plagued by today isn’t any blocking of communication, but 
pointless statements. (Deleuze 1995, 129) 
Have we come back, asks Mowitt, to the state that Brecht called 
“antediluvian” in his theory of radio, “that is, the state in which 
humans were in possession of a communications apparatus, 
but had no idea what to communicate?”(24). If so, the ques­
tion of whether communication is possible is still relevant, but it 
concerns something different, something that lies beneath the 
constant stream of communication that we are now ineluctably 
part of. For Deleuze, “solitude is the condition out of which this 
missing idea might emanate” (Mowitt, 24), from which we 
“might eventually find something to say” (Deleuze 1995, 129). 
Mowitt argues that “Deleuze is, if not mistaken, then certainly 
optimistic” (24). For Mowitt, rather than solitude, the concept 
of dialogue is key. As Mowitt writes:
Crucial in what follows will be an insistence on approaching 
dialogue not primarily as something characters in films have, 
nor as the speaking that human subjects engage in, but as 
an ontological structure, a certain, perhaps onto­theological 
account of the speaking subject cannot do without. (29) 
Speaking of an “onto­theological account of the speaking subject” 
has echoes of Heidegger, and the excess of communication that is 
not quite communication, or not quite communication yet, may at 
first glance be read as a reiteration of Heidegger’s “Man,” the his­
torical, factual background of the subject. The “Man,” of course, 
is a set of conventional, preconditioned views and attitudes, that 
which speaks the subject, unless the “Dasein” manages to seize 
itself from its state of “Uneigentlichkeit,” its state of being in thrall 
to convention (Heidegger 1996). However, as Mowitt’s insistence 
on the concept of dialogue already announces, it is ultimately not 
Heidegger who reveals what is in the crypt but Martin Buber. For 
Mowitt, it is not the solitude of self­empowerment, of “Eigentlich-
keit,” which offers a way to communication, but an ontological 
17openness to dialogue, understood as an “ontological structure … 
a speaking subject cannot do without” (29). 
Metz insisted that film is not communication because there is no 
bilateral exchange. For all the dialogue that happens on screen, 
the film will never enter into a dialogue with the viewer. Mowitt 
argues that it is precisely this non­communication, the lack of a 
reply, which makes film particularly apt to communicate about 
communication. In his analysis of the final scene of Cool Hand 
Luke, in which the main character addresses God in a church 
shortly before he dies, but remains without reply, Mowitt writes:
Luke is thrown into a dialogue through which something 
communicates in communication that is not communication. 
But neither is it simply the latter’s failure. This something 
is an inhuman or pre­human, thus lifeless operation of the 
im­personal. The machine in the ghost, … the apparatus of 
enunciation itself. (32) 
In this particular case, the apparatus of enunciation is the tech­
nique of film editing, or more specifically, the reverse shot from 
above to Luke’s look upwards in the church that underscores the 
lack of a reply. 
So is film a medium of communication? 
With John Mowitt, we could argue that film, particularly in a 
situation in which communication is “that to which we now have 
ready access” (24), is the medium which we need to understand 
what communication is.
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Tracks from the Crypt
John Mowitt
David	Bowie’s	2015	Blackstar has been under-
stood by critics and fans alike to have a certain 
valedictory	status.	For	them,	perhaps	for	us,	it	
is	a	39-minute	and	13-second	farewell.	A	long	
goodbye.	My	angle	is	different.	By	situating	
the Bowie/Renck collaboration on “Lazarus” 
in the context of a meditation on the ques-
tion	once	posed	by	Georg	Stanitzek,	“Was	ist	
Kommunikation?” I consider the CD and the 
video	as	experiments	in	re-configuration.	
More	specifically,	by	thinking	about	the	dis-
tinctly cinematic iteration of the question of 
communication (citing here Captain’s “what 
we have here is … failure to communicate” 
from Cool Hand Luke) I propose that mediated 
22 communication embodies the Ich/Es modality 
of dialogue disparaged by Martin Buber. What 
this invites us to consider is whether “Lazarus” 
in particular isn’t the generation of an audio-
visual tombeau from which or out of which com-
munication strains are to be heard. Is it “saying” 
farewell? Is it “saying” anything? By drawing on 
Jacques Derrida’s appropriation of the crypt in 
the	work	of	Abraham	and	Torok,	I	propose	that	
“Lazarus” manages (and the feat is neither small 
nor	insignificant)	to	communicate	nothing.	In	
effect,	“Lazarus”	is	the	very	sound,	not	of	a	
failure	to	communicate,	but	of	a	“speaking”	
emptied of what protects it from mediation. 
Here,	Bowie’s	gnomic	persona	assumes	a	
political valence not typically ascribed to it.
23“You ain’t heard nothin’ yet” 
Al Jolson in the Jazz Singer
My title will likely evoke for some the comic books written and 
drawn by Bill Gaines and Al Feldstein from 1950 to 1955 under 
the title, “Tales from the Crypt,” and while deliberate, this inter­
textual gesture calls for clarification. Typically framed in the 
popular genre of Gothic horror, these comics toyed with our fear 
of death, but did not exactly concern themselves with the crypt 
as a locus of communication. The comics were not thinking about 
themselves as communications from the crypt. They were not 
thinking about what a crypt is, or might be. Here then is where 
my intertextual gesture breaks off. Specifically, I want to tarry 
over the crypt, and in particular I want to evoke its connotative 
density to think about the phenomenon of the tombeau, the 
tomb, whether literary (think Mallarmé and Anatole) or musical 
(think Ravel and Couperin). More specifically still I want to explore 
here what the concept of the musical tombeau might, as if acting 
like an induction loop, allow us to “pick up,” “receive” from David 
Bowie’s final collection of songs, Blackstar. To put the matter 
succinctly, it is from these tracks that I will engage the problem of 
communication as a port through which to examine the audio­
visual configuration of film and video.
In thus placing the problem of communication in the foreground 
of these remarks I am in a sense echoing Georg Stanitzek’s still 
resonant question: “Was ist Kommunikation?” a formulation—at 
once interrogative and declarative—that reminds us that, oddly, 
in the field of mass communications, we have thought perhaps 
more carefully about the problem of the masses—do they exist, 
who are they, what if anything do they think?—than the problem 
of communication itself. In short, what is it, does it happen and 
how does anyone know? Stanitzek, whose study auto­poetically 
performed these difficulties, gave—at least to me—fresh import 
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getting people to express themselves but of providing little gaps 
of solitude and silence in which they might eventually find some­
thing to say…. What we are plagued by today isn’t any blocking 
of communication, but pointless statements” (1995, 129). Put 
differently, if communication is that to which we now have ready 
access, have we returned to the state Brecht—when theorizing 
radio—called antediluvian, that is, the state in which humans 
were in possession of a communications apparatus, but had no 
idea what to communicate? Deleuze seems confident that soli­
tude is the condition out of which this missing idea might ema­
nate. But, I will argue, Deleuze is, if not mistaken, then certainly 
optimistic. The issue is not formulating, out of a certain solitude, 
something worthy of communicating, but rather acknowledging 
that even that most worthy of communication cannot be com­
municated. Not because we are mediatized subjects (Guattari’s 
characterization), but because communication itself has given up 
the ghost. Or, stated in the spirit of Kafka’s astonishing letter to 
Milena Jesenská from late 1922: “Writing letters … means expos­
ing oneself to the ghosts who are greedily waiting precisely for 
that. Written kisses never arrive at their destination; the ghosts 
drink them up along the way” (1990, 223). In the course of these 
remarks I will have occasion to return to the figure of Kafka, but 
to adumbrate with enigmatic brevity, more haunting than the 
“ghost in the machine” (Gilbert Ryle’s famous account of the 
Cartesian mind) is the machine in the ghost.1 This machine—in 
Kafka’s letter a means of communication devised at “the moment 
1 In the context being woven here it is worth acknowledging that Ryle’s for­
mulation was taken up by the Hungarian thinker Arthur Koestler in a text by 
that very name, and further that “Ghost in the Machine” serves as the title 
for the fourth album by The Police. Sting has acknowledged and emphasized 
his borrowing from Koestler, without really thinking about what the mind 
becomes in the wake of a philosophical repudiation of dualism, or what, in 
turn, might constitute the post­dualist machine. In a more explicitly musico­
logical vein Larry Kramer in “The Ghost in the Machine” from Why Classical 
Music Still Matters explores how the ghost that is us, literally, plays itself out 
on the piano keyboard, without ultimately making the twist I am proposing 
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tion. It compels us to say nothing.2 
Failure	to	Communicate
Although he never applied it to film, Paul de Man’s concept of the 
“allegory of reading” can be made to serve an important func­
tion in the context I am elaborating. Specifically, it helps orient 
our attention to moments in the medium of the cinema where 
that medium communicates about itself as a medium of com­
munication. More than instances of reflexivity, such moments 
act out insights into the way particular films can be shown to 
pass information to their audiences about their own relation 
to information. With this in mind I found myself thinking, with 
Stanitzek’s meditation looming on the horizon, about the line 
from Stuart Rosenberg’s Cool Hand Luke (USA 1967), “what we got 
here is … failure to communicate,” a line that echoes in the film 
precisely in being spoken twice, by two different subjects. In its 
first iteration the line is delivered by “the Captain,” who oversees 
a Florida chain gang that includes among its members one Lucas 
Jackson, the Luke of the title. It occurs in a sequence that depicts 
of thinking the machine (for me, as if translating Kittler’s Aufschreibesystem 
literally, the inscription system) as the occasion for its own ghost.
2 Although it is framed as a meditation on the ontological character of 
philosophy, Giorgio Agamben’s “Experimentum Vocis” advances an argu­
ment whose resonances with my own deserve mention. Elaborating on 
Benveniste’s well­known distinction between histoire and discours Agamben, 
through a commentary on Plato, shows that this distinction is the ground­
less ground for the distinction between language and being. As he puts 
it: “Precisely because being gives itself in language, but language remains 
unsaid in what it says and manifests, being destines itself and unveils itself 
for speakers in an epochal history” (Agamben 2018, 10). This “unsaid in say­
ing” has its prototype, as a theory of philosophy in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
proposition regarding the plane of immanence, defined in What is Philoso-
phy? as: “that which must be thought, but which cannot be thought. It is the 
nonthought within thought” (1994, 59). In both cases, I am proposing that 
what is at stake here is what Martin Buber means by the Ich und Es dialogue, 
a dialogue in which (the) nothing is said.
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relevant dialogue is: Captain, “You gonna get used to wearin’ 
them chains after a while Luke, but you never gonna stop listenin’ 
to them clinkin’. They gonna remind you of what I been sayin’ for 
your own good.” Luke (with a trace of his signature grin), “I wish 
you’d stop bein’ so good to me Capt.” Captain (viciously striking 
Luke with a truncheon), “Don’t you ever talk that way to me.” Luke 
falls and rolls into the foreground of a shot that has otherwise 
framed the encounter between the two men from the point of 
view of the chain gang/audience. Captain, “What we got here is … 
failure to communicate. Some men you jus’ can’t reach, so you get 
what we had here last week, which is the way he wants it. Well, 
he gets it, and I don’t like it any more than you men.” The Captain 
leaves the frame to the left, and we watch Luke stagger up to his 
knees, the chains conspicuously clinking on the soundtrack. 
The second iteration of the line is by Luke himself and it occurs 
in the last sequence of the film. Having escaped the chain gang 
yet again and on the run Luke hides in a clapboard church. He 
enters, notes that the church is empty and begins his concluding 
monologue: 
Anybody here? Hey Old Man, you home tonight? Can you 
spare a minute? It ’s time we had a little talk. I know I’m 
a pretty evil fellow. I killed people in war, got drunk and 
chewed up municipal property. I know I ain’t got no call to 
ask much, but even so you gotta admit that you ain’t dealt 
me no cards in a long time. It looks like you got things fixed 
so I can’t never win out. You made me like I am. Inside, out­
side all them rules and regulations and bosses, and just 
where am I supposed to fit in? Old man, I gotta tell you I 
started out pretty strong and fast, but it began to get to me. 
When does it end? What dya got in mind for me? What do I 
do now?
Luke, as if anticipating the Old Man’s answer, then kneels to pray. 
A cut­away shot has established that the Captain and the county 
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prayers Dragline (a fellow member of the chain gang and admirer 
of Luke) enters the church. He tries to convince Luke to surrender, 
saying that a deal for leniency has been struck. Luke responds by 
going to a window and, looking out at the assembled law enforce­
ment officers, he repeats the Captain’s line, “What we got here is 
a failure to communicate.” A rifle is discharged and Luke falls back 
into the church mortally wounded. In the subsequent and closing 
segment, Luke is thrown into the back of a squad car and the Cap­
tain directs the officer to take him, not to a nearby hospital, but to 
the fatally more distant county jail. In the penultimate shot of the 
film we watch in close­up as the rifleman’s mirrored sunglasses 
are crushed by the squad car.
Adapted from a novel written by Donn Pearce, himself once 
a member of a chain gang, the film has long been read as the 
quintessential anti­establishment sixties film. Its Christian, even 
Kierkegaardian dimension—Luke as a Knight of Faith—has also 
been emphasized. I, however, wish to make a different point, 
one that rewords these theological resonances. The echoed line 
contains Luke’s dying words. They fork between the infelicitous 
epiphanic scene in the church and thus in response to the Old 
Man’s silence, and the Captain, thereby suggesting that Luke is 
receiving the death he has asked for. As Luke’s last line it termi­
nates the dialogue between both the law and the church, literal­
izing Luke’s failure to communicate with either. So two summary 
points. First, it is important to note the difference between the 
two iterations of the failure. In the first, spoken by the Captain, 
there is an elliptical suspension of the indefinite article, “a.” The 
Captain says, “what we got here is … failure to communicate,” 
where failure feels grammatically neuter, that is general, rather 
than either definite or indefinite. This makes the Captain’s line 
resonate with an accordingly more “theoretical” tone. When Luke 
repeats it he says, “What we got here is a failure to communicate,” 
in effect stripping the Captain’s theoretical proposition of its false 
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change is lethal.
Second–and this will seem rather technical but not therefore 
irrelevant–in the sequence where Luke has kneeled to pray he is 
framed in a medium shot and we can see him open his left eye 
and cast it upwards into the belfry. In a cinematic pattern used 
to enunciate conversation—the so­called shot reverse—the 
subsequent shot is a long shot up into the rafters of the belfry, 
Luke’s point of view. Silence. We then return to the prior set­up 
as Luke says, “Yeah, that’s what I thought. I guess I am pretty 
tough to deal with. A hard case. I guess I gotta find my own way.” 
This is then followed by a very high angle long shot as if from 
the silent Old Man’s point of view. More silence. Nothing is said. 
However, I would argue that this conforms, almost literally, to 
Jacques Lacan’s definition of speech in the “Rome Discourse,” to 
wit, “there is no speech without a response, even if speech meets 
only with silence, provided it has an auditor” (2006, 206). From 
such a vantage point even the failure to communicate is a com­
munication, as if to underscore Julia Kristeva’s proposition that 
the human being is a speaking subject. But the question nags: if 
failed communication is communication, what is communication? 
To appreciate fully what might be at issue here it seems appropri­
ate to note that an important, even decisive, element punctuates 
the scene, namely, the cinematic technique of the shot reverse 
that effects, even stages, the effectively failed communication 
between Luke and the Old Man. Both it and the nothing said by 
the Old Man (the auditor) resonate in a silence that, in constitut­
ing a response, apparently constitutes speech as speech. Typi­
cally, in Western (although not exclusively) cinema this technique 
facilitates or supports the speech act; here, however, a mode or 
device of supplementation is brought abruptly forward, a sup­
plementation that stresses the technical mediation that allows 
speech to take place even when it doesn’t. In effect, what surfaces 
in the sequence is the apparatus of enunciation, the assemblage 
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means of this failure.
We	Are	What	It	Says
If it makes sense to think of this material allegorically, then the 
failure to communicate repeats in both the dialogue (the film) 
and the medium (the cinema) and does so in such a way that 
invites much more careful scrutiny about dialogue, that is, the 
communicating in the film that transubstantiates the unspoken 
word of God into the bullet that gives Luke what he asked for. 
Crucial in what follows will be an insistence on approaching 
dialogue not primarily as something characters in films have, 
nor as the speaking that human subjects engage in, but as 
an ontological structure, a certain, perhaps onto­theological 
account of the speaking subject cannot do without. Put in the 
form of a provocation: if dialogue matters in film, if it is worthy 
of the scholarly attention that has long been devoted to it, this 
is because dialogue matters to the human animal as such. Such 
a provocation obliges one, or so I will propose, despite all the 
attention paid to Mikhail Bakhtin in the waning decades of the 
preceding century, to turn back to his own “master,” namely, the 
remarkable Jewish thinker of dialogue, Martin Buber. My reading 
of his work, specifically the powerful Ich und Du, will be pointedly 
perverse, but to appreciate this a bit of summary is required. 
Written in 1923, I and You (and I will note in passing that I am 
following Walter Kaufmann’s more secular rendering of the 
German second person pronoun Du) is a compact, yet hugely 
influential formulation of the theology of human existence. 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, published only four years later, takes 
up—however anxiously—many of its themes and references, 
a fact that eventually brought the two men together at Lake 
Konstanz in 1957. At the heart of Buber’s statement stands his 
concept of the Grundworte, in Smith’s translation, the “primary 
words,” words that express the twofold attitude (Haltung) of 
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guistics, Buber characterizes the primary words as two pairs: I 
and You and I and It, further complicating things when he insists 
that “I” is actually an abbreviation (Abkürzung) for the phrase, 
“this man here who is speaking.” The entire book then con­
cerns itself with sorting the matter of how these pairs orient 
and organize human reality. As my passing allusion to lin­
guistics will suggest, the notion that words, especially primary 
words, articulate relations contains in nuce Bakhtin and Valentin 
Volosinov’s repudiation of Saussure’s rejection of parole as the 
proper object of linguistic science. Be that as it may, what forms 
implacably in Buber’s statement is an argument that proposes 
dialogue as the irreducible medium of human being. Dialogue is 
not something we have; it is something we are. 
Now, despite the fact that Buber writes: “without It (das Es) man 
cannot live, but he who lives with It alone is not man” (1958, 
52, my emphasis), where the two so­called primary words are 
insistently entwined, his thought is more typically evoked through 
the titular formula, “I and You.” Relation, as captured in the I/You 
encounter, is conceived as more ontologically secure than is the 
separation marked out in the I/It encounter. While a great deal 
might be said about Buber’s struggle to derive the You from the It 
without triggering the paradox of two first principles, my stress, 
and I have acknowledged its perversity, will fall instead on what 
can be said about the dialogue on or with the It. As you will have 
guessed at this point, this dialogue is what seems figured in the 
“failure to communicate” allegorized in Cool Hand Luke.3
Early in I and You Buber, again in a provocative linguistic register, 
says something important about the It. “The other primary word 
3 In the “Whistling” chapter of Sounds: The Ambient Humanities I have teased 
out and toyed with the series—sibilant, S, das Es—drawing attention to 
the Freudian treatment of what Strachey rendered as “the Id.” While a 
reiteration of this argument may seem called for here (is Buber thinking of 
the unconscious, or for that matter precisely not thinking of it?), I ’ll demur. 
Consider this argument as a constant murmur accompanying these remarks.
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the primary word, one of the words He and She can replace It” 
(15). Given that “it” is precisely neuter, how can that be? A clue 
is offered later when, in discussing humanity’s relation to God, 
Buber writes: “Men have always addressed their eternal You with 
many names. In singing of Him who was thus named they always 
had the You in mind: the first myths were hymns of praise. Then 
the names took refuge in the language of It; men were more 
and more strongly moved to address their eternal You as an It” 
(99). Clarified here is that naming God “Him” (setting aside Mary 
Daly’s misgivings for the moment) is a fateful step away from 
the You toward the It. Why? Because He or She, but here Him, 
can substitute for the It. What authorizes Buber’s assertion is the 
grammatical fact, as Emile Benveniste reminded us, that the third 
person—he, she, it, etc.—is not a person at all. It is precisely im­
personal. While this might suggest or even imply that It is divine, 
that is, inhuman, Buber regards it as, in effect, the opposite. In 
a lovely figure he warns against a theology of “falling upwards,” 
that is, falling out of the profane up into the sacred. That is, of 
misrecognizing the fundamental horizontality of paradise. That 
said, when, anticipating Derrida’s encounter with his cat by nearly 
80 years, he asks, on behalf of the cat, “Do I [the cat] exist in 
your sight. . . What is it that comes to me? What is it?” (125), add­
ing that, “the ‘it ’ here is to be imagined as the streaming human 
glance (strömenden Menschenblick),” that is, the visual encounter 
between the human animal and the nonhuman animal from 
the latter’s point of view but as voiced by the human. As you will 
appreciate, this clouds the ontological waters because cat and 
God are equally im­personal, but in a way that places unbearable 
strain on the sense of “equal.”
What this invites, I will argue, is consideration of the fact that 
Buber’s It is more difficult to parse, to pin down than its routinely 
dismissive pairing with the You might suggest. Perhaps It is the 
watchword of separation because it is separated from itself, 
naming, as has just been established, the Blick through which the 
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and range of the dialogic relation. For film scholars, this “glance,” 
as Smith renders it, bears an uncanny resemblance to the “gaze” 
that frames Luke in his “dialogue” with the Old Man moments 
before he is killed. Luke speaks both for and to the one who gazes 
down in silence, and in failing to communicate, Luke is thrown 
into a dialogue through which something communicates in com­
munication that is not communication. But neither is it simply the 
latter’s failure. This something is an inhuman or pre­human, thus 
lifeless operation of the im­personal. The machine in the ghost, 
or, as put earlier, the apparatus of enunciation itself. 
Significantly, I will argue, Buber explores, however gingerly, these 
resonances of the It by insisting that the eternal You, that god, is 
“wholly Other” (ganz Andere) and this despite his immediate qual­
ification that god is also “wholly Same” (ganz Selbe), a formulation 
that leads to the discreetly Freudian proposition, “he is nearer to 
me than my I” (104). Weirdly, the figure of, indeed the very name 
for, relation as such is thus the wholly Other that separates the 
“my” from the “I.” Such observations suggest that, among other 
things, Buber, despite his obvious sensitivity to grammar, writes 
down his speech without always tracking how It speaks, as it 
were, without him.
Be that as it may, given Buber’s invocation of the “wholly Other,” 
you will not be surprised to learn that I and You attracted the 
sustained critical attention of Emmanuel Levinas, a theoretical 
voice much more familiar to our contemporary ears. I invoke him 
here because Levinas’s critique underscores motifs of increasing 
pertinence as I turn more directly to explore the terms of my title: 
tracks from the crypt.
Absolutely Cryptic Communication
In 1986 Levinas gave an interview to Anne­Catherine Benchelah. It 
appeared under the title “The Proximity of the Other,” and it gives 
expression to what Levinas will later call his acute wariness of 
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would be alterity itself, Levinas responds: 
Buber says that when I say ‘Thou,’ I know that I am saying 
‘Thou’ to someone who is an I, and that he says ‘Thou’ to me. 
Consequently, in the I­Thou relation, we are from the outset 
in society with each other, but this is a society in which 
we are equals, the one in regard to the other; I am to the 
other what the other is to me. My aim consisted in putting 
into question this initial reciprocity with the other whom I 
address. (213)
Put differently, while conceding that “whoever walks on Buber’s 
ground owes allegiance to Buber” (179), Levinas is here agreeing 
with Benchelah that Buber’s “wholly Other” is not wholly other 
enough, it does not achieve the condition of alterity itself. 
Because Buber’s “other,” the eternal You, remains the subject of 
the I’s address, dialogue is not only possible, but for Levinas it 
is presupposed rather than established or grounded. In play/at 
stake here is the very concept of the human animal as a speaking 
subject.
It is true that Levinas does not develop the potential tie between 
the “other as alterity” and the It, but he does say the following: 
“Yet the apparent simplicity of the I­Thou relation in its very 
asymmetry, is again disturbed by the appearance of the third 
man who places himself beside the other, the Thou. The third is 
himself a neighbour, a face, an unreachable alterity” (214). The 
reference here is not to Carol Reed’s brilliant film, but, I suggest, 
to the third person, that is, the im­personal pronoun, It. To again 
cite Levinas, “This ‘it ’ marks the impersonal character of this 
stage in which impersonal consciousness experiences something 
without objects, without substance—a nothing that is not a 
nothing, for this nothing is full of murmuring, a murmuring which 
is unnamed” (212). For Buber, as you will recall, God is what is 
or ought to be unnamed, and under no circumstances named 
with the third person pronoun Him behind which lurks the It. 
34 For Levinas, what is unnamed, perhaps even unnameable, is 
the murmur that fills a no­thing that is not nothing. This sound, 
precisely to the extent that it resounds in and as the im­person, 
ought to interest us more than it interests Levinas. It will certainly 
interest me.
In Sounds I developed the distinction between the murmur and 
the whisper in some detail, noting the interesting tendency 
within French to associate murmuring with non­human sounds, 
for example, insects. Although broadly pertinent here, I want 
to stress something else. To invoke an earlier turn of phrase, 
the murmur might better be said—explicitly in keeping faith 
with Levinas’s critique of Buber—to designate the sound of the 
machine in the ghost, the resonance of an operating that, like 
alterity itself (according to Levinas) comes before knowledge. 
But—and the question seems obvious enough—does the 
machine, and more specifically, the cinema machine really fit 
here? It does. Commenting on the one evocation of the cinema 
that appears in I and You, I think the point can be secured. This 
evocation occurs in the final section of Part Two where Buber is 
exploring the motif of alienation, that is, the sense that arises 
within the I that it is torn asunder by its estrangement from the 
world of the It. Under such circumstances the I turns to thought 
(Denken) as the site of mediation between the I and the world. 
Through an elaborate figure whereby thought projects strips of 
images—Buber characterizes them as cinematographic (1996, 
95)—on opposite sides of a room, each captioned, “One and all,” 
Buber decisively renders cognitive mediation mediatic. Since, 
in the terms of his parable, one wall contains images of “the 
soul” and the other images of “the world,” the alienated I tries 
to comfort itself by turning from side to side. In effect, panning. 
But, and Buber’s fascination with the cinematic technique of the 
superimposed image is plain, what happens if the walls con­
verge in the flash of an overlap between their respective strips 
of images? As he writes: “A deeper shudder seizes him,” (96) a 
formulation I read as evoking his recognition that precisely to 
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alienation it is otherwise called upon to quell. Typically, this sort 
of formulation is read as delimiting the power of thought in an 
ontology of dialogue, but it seems to me that it can also be read 
as an acknowledgement of the radical alterity that murmurs 
within the im­person, the It. The cinematic image is not here 
merely an example; it is also a device deployed within thought to 
acknowledge what rattles both its attention and its attunement.
What, in the wake of this, might we say about the machine of 
phonography, or more broadly, the recording of sound, whether 
in the form of a murmur or in the form of music? What or where 
is its ghost within which it rattles? Let us then come to the 
musical tombeau. If one takes Ravel’s Le Tombeau de Couperin as 
paradigmatic of the form, what one has is a short composition 
divided up into 6 parts or movements, each in ways distinctive to 
its formal function or style (Fugue, Toccata, etc.) commemorating 
the life of the one entombed.4 Very plainly, the music marks the 
site of the tomb from the outside, as if echo­locating the contours 
of the casket. 
4 Someone who would disagree with the emphasis I have placed here on 
Ravel is Susan McClary; not because she accepts Adorno’s dismissal of Ravel 
as trafficking in “disguise” (she has her own fish to fry with “Teddie”), but 
because Couperin matters to her thinking about a much earlier tombeau, 
Jean Henry D’Anglebert ’s Tombeau de Mr de Chambonnières. Among her 
several themes is the question of with what historical assumptions do we 
listen to or attempt to perform the French baroque canon, but her emphasis 
on the temporality of absorption (akin to what Deleuze means by “the 
time­image”) speaks very immediately to what I thought I was listening to 
in Bowie’s tombeau. As she is a much cleverer musicological inchworm than 
I, I ’ll not attempt to replicate the level of her attention in my discussion, 
but when she describes the sonic structure of the tombeau as exhibiting 
the distinctly Gallic properties of a “hermetically sealed jar,” (McClary 2000, 
sec. 41) this struck an immediate chord. Of course, to hermetically seal 
something (say, a crypt) means to magically (the term derives from Hermes 
Trismegistus) prevent liquid from escaping its container. In effect, it allows 
nothing to pass. But what does this nothing that passes sound like? This is 
the question that McClary’s meditation left me absorbed with.
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a tomb that approaches it from the outside. The “voice” of the 
tomb is thus both beyond and before the grave. Of interest is not 
only whether or how this voice communicates, but, as I intimated 
in my opening, what must communication be if it does? Or, and 
the provocation to thought verges on the intolerable, what if it 
does not? This is not the voice of the dead, it is a dead voice, a 
voice filled with the machine that ghosts it. To play out more sys­
tematically what is at issue here, especially as this might bear on 
the ontology of the dialogue to be found in the dispute between 
Buber and Levinas, I turn to my titular evocation of the crypt, 
a concept produced in the work of the psychoanalysts Nicolas 
Abraham and Maria Torok. It helps, I will propose, grasp the 
peculiar structure of an exteriorized interiority characteristic of 
the musical tomb, especially when we think about the tomb as 
a piece written, perhaps as a valedictory gesture, by someone 
burying him or herself alive within it.
The crypt opens at the semantic lip where the English word itself 
forks between code and grave. Taken as synonyms, code and 
grave cross through one another producing the materialization 
of a set that is not a member of itself. A terminal incompletion. In 
their remarkable study, The Wolf Man’s Magic Word, Abraham and 
Torok deploy the crypt to analyze one of Freud’s most perplexing 
analysands, Sergei Pankeiev (the “Wolf Man”), pushing at the 
very bounds of what is readable within psychoanalysis. Indeed, 
as they astutely observe, there is a remarkable topographic echo 
between the Wolf Man’s cryptonyms (they pointedly opposed 
these to metonyms) and Freud’s struggle, in this case history, to 
secure his science, not from the usual detractors, but from his 
innermost circle. As suggestive as such formulations are they do 
not isolate as effectively as does Derrida what is decisive about 
the crypt, both as a complication of the tomb and as a locus from 
which either tales or tracks might emerge.
In the wake of the failed optimism of three straightforward inter­
rogatives, “What is a crypt?” Derrida then elaborates: 
37Constructing a system of partitions, with their inner and 
outer surfaces, the cryptic enclave produces a cleft in space, 
in the assembled system of various places, in the archi­
tectonics of the open square within space, itself delimited 
by a generalized closure, in the forum. Within this forum, a 
place where the free circulation and exchange of objects 
and speeches can occur, the crypt constructs another more 
inward forum like a closed rostrum or speaker’s box, a safe: 
sealed and thus internal to itself, a secret interior within the 
public square, but, by the same token, outside it, external 
to the interior. Whatever one might write upon them, the 
crypt’s parietal surfaces do not simply separate an inner 
forum from an outer forum. The inner forum is (a) safe, and 
outcast outside inside the inside. That is the condition, and 
the stratagem, of the cryptic enclave’s ability to isolate, pro­
tect, to shelter from any penetration from anything that can 
filter in from the outside from outside along with air, light 
or sounds, along with the eye or the ear, the gesture of the 
spoken word. ([1986] 2017, xiv)
At one level, this drift toward the figure of the forum (italicized 
for emphasis in the passage), is another tropological manoeuvre 
designed to underscore the work of the title of the For­ward/
word, “Fors” in its contents. But when Derrida later situates 
the crypt on the cleft between introjection and incorporation, 
insisting that at stake here is the “appropriation and safekeeping 
of the other as other” (xvii), one realizes that forum, public square 
and the speeches circulating there all conspire to pitch this dis­
cussion of the crypt into the fray between Buber and Levinas with 
the consequence of posing the unnerving question: is dialogue 
possible in the face of an It that might be designated a crypt? Can 
I get from It to You and back?
Of equal interest, although doubtless only in the context I have 
woven, is Derrida’s reference to the speaker’s box, a reference 
by means of which, if paired, however asymmetrically, with 
Theodor Adorno’s physiognomic account of the “radio voice,” and 
38 the decisive role of the “loudspeaker” in generating it, one can 
grasp how the crypt and the musical tomb might be made for 
each other. But to what end, or with what effect? If, as has been 
noted, the musical tomb is conventionally crafted in the wake of 
a death, that is, as a commemoration for survivors, one is hard 
pressed here to harken to the music that might be emerging from 
the musical tomb and wafting into the public square, the forum. 
The crypt, by safekeeping the other as other, that is by sealing 
itself hermetically, draws attention to the arrogance of commem­
oration: the music is for us, not for you. By the same token, if the 
crypt is cryptic because it walls the inside out, then the sounds 
that communicate through its parietal surfaces might actually 
emanate from within. These musical strains meant for us are not 
ours, but its; that is, they approach from a “fors” that is, as is 
said, dead to us. The crypt is not for the dead, it is for that which 
in­animates the living. In this, I would argue, Mallarmé’s collection 
of ashen words, A Tomb for Anatole, predicts the encryption of the 
tomb, in general.5
Vital here is the clarification that at stake in the encryption of 
the tomb is not simply a reversal. The point is not that the music 
of the tomb comes before death, rather than after it. Were this 
the case my remarks would fall squarely within the paradigm of 
valediction, music as a farewell or leave­taking (a “self­epitaph” 
as Tony Visconti has described Blackstar), and pose little if any 
challenge to the notion of communication. With the advent of 
what Friedrich Kittler calls “phonography,” the music of the dead 
has, in principle, long been in a position to communicate with 
the living, to survive death. No, if the crypt matters here it is 
because it draws attention to the cleft in space that falls between 
5 In his introduction to Serge Margel’s Le Tombeau du dieu artisan (tomb of 
the artisan god), Derrida has commented at length on the structure of the 
tombeau. He brings out the points of contact between Margel and Mallarmé, 
notably the folding that makes their texts into instances of what they speak. 
Tomes that are tombs. No reference is made here to the concept/metaphor 
of the crypt, but the discussion that transpires on pages 9–12 invites such 
reference repeatedly (see Derrida 2017).
39the before and the after of death. Does the sound of music that 
happens here communicate, does it, can it, open a dialogue? If so, 
what is communicated as sound? What is (the) It?
Here we can no longer defer the encounter with Bowie’s Blackstar 
and, in the spirit of our thematic focus on configurations of film, 
Johan Renck’s video for the “Lazarus” track.
“Lazarus”:	All	or	Nothing
There is much, maybe even too much, to say here, but let me 
begin by noting that my remarks will not be fanatical. I leave the 
details that fanaticism can add here for others. Nor will I attempt 
the sort of writing perfected in Simon Critchley’s remarkable little 
study of Bowie. Instead, I want to explore in what sense this piece 
is precisely a track from a crypt, and what air pressure it thus 
brings to bear on the theme of the failure to communicate. Let 
me also note that my reading, though not fanatical, is obstinate.6 
It persists in the face of the following comments made by Johan 
Renck in an interview with Justin Joffe. Reporting on a conver­
sation with Bowie about the video, Renck cites Bowie as saying: 
“The one thing I think is important is not to go into any second 
guessing or analysing what these images mean, because they’re 
between you and me. People are going to go head over heels to 
try to break it down and figure it out across the spectrum and 
there’s no point in even engaging that.” Taken at their words I 
can now either simply step away from the keyboard, or stress 
that left open is the possibility, perhaps even the invitation, to 
formulate a first guess about the cleft between the images and 
the sounds, a cleft announced in the title that introduces a name 
6 Although, one might note, not obstinate enough. Among the several matters 
set aside in this reading is the uncanny resonance between the clapboard 
church where Luke goes to die, and the wardrobe from which “Lazarus” 
emerges and returns. The warp and woof of this resonance, however richly 
tangled, may not, in the end, be any more pertinent than the simple fact that 
a certain meta­commentary on communication echoes insistently within it.
40 that never sounds in the lyrics themselves. Such, in any case, will 
be my gambit, and so it comes as no surprise, I read the piece not 
as saying whatever anybody says it says, but as saying, that is, 
communicating, precisely nothing. As Bowie reportedly says: it ’s 
“between you and me.”
So off I tumble head over heels. Having directed our attention 
to the lyrics, it seems urgent to bring the piece within the orbit 
of our concerns, by noting that the first line, “Look up here, I’m 
in heaven,” a line whose first clause is repeated at the start of 
the second verse, solicits our Du, a “you” later engulfed in the 
pronoun “everybody,” who now knows the “I” who has become 
a me. Here however, the solicitation to look emerges from the 
face of one who cannot return the look, the face of the character 
Renck and Bowie call “Button Eyes,” the very persona or mask of 
das Es. The visual communication, the exchange between the “I” 
and the “everybody,” is blinkered, maybe even buttoned down. 
Just the same, this is being said. The sounds reach us and in 
doing so underscore that the image of one deprived of our image 
likewise reaches us, but figured by absence. The It is in the I and 
mediating, that is parasitizing, its relation to the You. This is what 
the video says/shows as if a text message on the cell phone (not, 
by the way, “mobile”) dropped below.
Of course, the line “Everybody knows me now,” points to one of 
Bowie’s great themes, namely fama, and just as it anticipates the 
star’s obituary, it cuts into the “me” differently. That is, it asks 
which “me” does everybody know? Am I who everybody knows or 
am I already and forever dead to you? Whence, I would suggest, 
the shift from heaven to danger in the second verse, a verse 
that introduces the figure of “the muse” (a hand that reaches 
up from below the bed) and is visually enunciated through an 
extraordinary circular tracking shot that executes literally what, 
following Buber, we might call a “falling upward.” In effect, we are 
here given the cryptic, gyroscopic template of the entire audio­
visual communication. It winds around its unwinding.
41Reference to verses here calls attention to the musical material 
as such. The song contains a short intro, three verses, a break—
middle eight—and an outro. It is written in A minor, and set in 
4/4 time without, on the drum track, a true backbeat. In the 
verses, the lyrics are delivered with little melodic fluctuation, 
quasi parlando, and supported by a simple chord pattern, a 
toggle back and forth from A minor to F. Significantly, because 
it is performed by Bowie himself, the verses are punctuated 
with an upward, aggressive movement of power chords: F, G, A, 
effectively reversing the toggle between A minor and F. Drawing 
even more “delicious” attention to this gesture upward, is a 
second, lead guitar part doubled by McCaslin’s saxophone line 
that descends, essentially on the beat, from C to B to G. In this 
“contrary” motion the “falling upwards” assumes tonal form. The 
middle eight modulates up a third to C and complicates the chord 
pattern by introducing a third chord, E flat, inserted before F. The 
outro, and it is truncated in the video, repeats the pattern of the 
verses. A few bars following the break, the saxophone bursts into 
an acrobatic solo, holding a note only to leap two octaves above 
it and on into racing 16th notes, a solo that literally exhausts 
itself. Indeed, this is visually choreographed so that the third 
verse can re­establish the tune’s animating groove. The rhythmic 
bottom is held together around the 4/4 pulse, with the bass line 
(vaguely summoning The Cure’s “Pictures of You”) agitating it with 
steady eighth notes and arpeggioed flourishes within A minor 
and F. The overall feel is what the late great Chuck Berry once 
called “modern jazz” played, of course, not too darn fast. Indeed, 
Bowie sought out Donny McCaslin’s jazz quartet for the Blackstar 
sessions.
If such details matter it is because they are not the mere vehicle 
for the images and lyrics. They are not what entombs the body 
that matters, they define one of the parietal surfaces of the 
crypt that, with the piece itself, opens in the form of a wardrobe, 
a wardrobe (the British prefer wardrobe to closet) from which 
everything leaves and returns. Indeed, the entire piece traces 
42 this Ouroboros. As such, this draws a certain keen attention to 
what I, following a habit of longstanding, call the break. Musically 
modulating into the relative major of the song’s key, and shifting 
into the past tense—“By the time I got to New York, I was living 
like a king”—this is also where, in a costume recycled from 
Station to Station, Bowie looks out at us with his “own” eyes. If 
one considers that the name “Lazarus,” suppressed in the lyrics, 
arises in the image, then the modulation into C (played, I note, on 
piano without the black keys) operates as an un­wrapping (pun 
intended). Emerging from the wardrobe, Lazarus’s wrappings 
are removed as he returns to life. As if to underscore the shift, 
the final line of the break, prior to the displacement of the voice 
by the horn, is “I was looking for your ass,” where the antiphonal 
“look up here,” of the first two verses, is reversed from the 
present imperative to the past declarative, and this as the image 
flits back and forth between “Button Eyes” and “Bowie.” You and 
I becomes I and you, or at least “your ass,” a hip hop formulation 
that through metonymic compression designates its addressee as 
someone in danger (either real or feigned).
But there is more to the break than this. During it a figure, 
vaguely but distinctly “female,” who has otherwise merely men­
aced the frame, emerges as a tormenting muse, reframing the 
break as a scene in which the drama of composition, and thus 
communication, is staged. When, immediately prior to the solo, 
we see Bowie seated at his writing desk, with pen in hand, the 
bland overarching theme of creativity sharpens into a variant of 
the fama motif emphasized earlier. Put differently, inspiration is 
here presented as the mad drive to communicate, but under the 
sign of expiration, an exhausted loss of breath that the saxo­
phone mimics as the writer collapses. If the muse menaces from 
below it is because she demands that saying happens even when 
there is nothing (left) to say.
The following verse puts two final details into the mix. It reads: 
“This way, or no way/You know I’ll be free/Just like that bluebird/
Ain’t that just like me?” The salient details are the figure of the 
43bluebird and the twisted phrase: “Ain’t that just like me?” What 
makes them resonate is the stress placed on the demonstrative 
pronoun, “that.” In the case of the bluebird, “that” operates to 
refer us not to any old bluebird, but to that bluebird, that is the 
one we “all” know, that is, the “bluebird of happiness” treated 
at length by Maurice Maeterlinck in his play The Blue Bird and, 
decisively closer to Bowie’s heart, sung about by Judy Garland 
in The Wizard of Oz (USA 1940).7 In the case of the phrase, “that” 
operates, in conformity with Charles Sanders Peirce’s account of 
the index, as a demonstrative pronoun that registers a preceding 
noun, in this case, the bluebird with whom Bowie shares the one 
way passage to freedom. Taken as part of the phrase, “that” puts 
it in touch with the preceding phrase, and together they—through 
the vernacular contraction “ain’t”—pose the rhetorical question: 
is this, is It, not just like me.
But what is It? What is it that Bowie is just like? At the risk of accel­
erating my offensive tumble, it seems worth nothing that both 
in The Blue Bird (USA 1940) and in The Wizard of Oz the bluebird 
serves to effect a turn within happiness, a turn that in Fleming 
et al.’s film allows Dorothy to finally realize that “there is no 
place like home.” This turn explicitly traces a cryptic topography 
by establishing that the outside, the locus of freedom and 
happiness, is actually always already inside. To be “just like” 
that bluebird is thus to be free, but in precisely this cryptic way. 
Moreover, if we recall that the octave leap that occurs in the line, 
“somewhere over the rainbow,” is precisely the same leap traced 
in “Starman” (indeed, the melodic lines in both songs converge 
note for note), the song that announced Bowie’s “arrival” in 1972 
on Top of the Pops, then we hear in the allusive bluebird a similar 
7 In the “dueling” careers of Judy Garland and Shirley Temple it happens that 
the latter starred in a film based on the Maeterlinck play called, The Blue 
Bird. Made in 1940 and directed by Walter Lang, the film, although not a 
musical, made it clear that, at least from the standpoint of the composer, Yip 
Harburg, the blue bird in question was the one given narrative significance 
by Maeterlinck. It is a pastoral thus damaged figure not unlike the “blue 
flower” dear to both Novalis and Benjamin.
44 cryptic folding of the end of a career back onto its beginning. 
Here, of course, the temptation is strong to read the phrase as a 
valediction—Bowie, like many before him, sees himself liberated 
from his mortal coil—but we are urged to hesitate here precisely 
by the reiterated “just like.” This is not me. It is merely just like me. 
In fact, strictly speaking, and listen carefully, “ain’t that just like 
me.” Verging on litotic, this formulation both reminds us that we 
know this man well enough to know what he is likely to say, but at 
the same time, that whatever we know about a man who might fly 
from earth only to return home, this knowledge is hemmed in by 
simile, by a figure of speech.
My earlier demurral about mimicking Critchley’s style should not 
be taken to mean that I have nothing to say about what he says 
about Blackstar. Indeed, I will bring these remarks to conclusion 
by engaging him directly and, in the process, clarify what I wish 
to leave you with regarding the question of communication. In 
meditating on the significance of Bowie’s musical theatre piece 
(co­written with Enda Walsh), Lazarus, Critchley writes the follow­
ing: “Is Bowie Lazarus? Is this why he chooses to use this final per­
sona in order to say goodbye to us? And in choosing the character 
of Lazarus as the one who is unable to die is Bowie even saying 
goodbye?” (2016, 219). After a brief detour through a different 
Kafka—not the Kafka of the correspondence with Milena but 
Kafka the author of “The Hunter Gracchus”—he turns to puzzle 
out his hesitation about the valedictory character of Blackstar 
writing: “They [Gracchus, Lazarus and Newton—Bowie’s charac­
ter in Roeg’s The Man Who Fell to Earth (UK 1976)] occupy the space 
between the living and the dead, the realm of purgatorial ghosts 
and spectres. Perhaps Bowie is telling us that he also occupies 
that space between life and death, that his art constantly moved 
between these two realms, these two worlds, while belonging 
fully to neither” (220). While there is much to agree with here, I 
hope you will understand why, and on which terms, I think more 
precision is warranted. “Ghosts and spectres”?
45Recall that “Lazarus” appears on the lip of both the video and 
the song in their titles. It appears as a word, thus an image, and 
precisely a word that is not said, that is silent. Moreover, insofar 
as “Lazarus” appears inside the work, he appears precisely as a 
figure, that is, someone just like himself, a figure who emerges 
from off­screen space, the wardrobe, to which it later returns. 
The sounds from which the word “Lazarus” is absent happen in 
the space between the departure and return of this figure to the 
wardrobe. Earlier, I proposed that the wardrobe be better taken 
as a crypt, but what that implies can now be clarified. If the crypt 
is this impossible structure of parietal surfaces across which the 
self and the wholly other are distributed, then to associate the 
crypt with the wardrobe means that it manifests not in the piece 
of furniture, but in the space that delimits what is outside it—
where and when the song occurs—and what is inside it, the off­
screen space of what precisely exceeds both sound and image. 
This topography has its analogue in the relation between the 
word/name, “Lazarus,” and the image/song where he appears, 
only and decisively as someone “like” “Lazarus.” Thus, if Bowie is 
“Lazarus” he is so precisely to the extent that they both are like 
who they are and are not. They are not only like each other, but 
they are only like themselves.
But let’s come to the crux: is he in dialogue with us? Is he saying 
goodbye? Is he telling us that he occupies the space between life 
and death? What, not to put too fine a point on it, is this musical 
crypt communicating? Shifting here to the track from the artist 
is important, not because the intentional fallacy would instantly 
trigger the fanaticism I have been seeking to avoid, but because 
it helps us keep track of the machine in the ghost, the collective 
assemblage of enunciation that constitutes the It of any and 
every dialogue that transpires between an I and a You. What 
becomes audible here is not the word “goodbye,” here synony­
mous with aloha, that is hello and goodbye (among many other 
46 things), but nothing.8 The track from this crypt says nothing, but 
it does so emphatically, that is, it does so by hollowing out the 
event of communication even as it takes place. In this, let me 
propose that Blackstar—the artwork, the commodity, the file, 
etc.—is a deeply political gesture, one whose political force can 
be gauged by recalling what Deleuze was trying to tell us about 
the contemporary plague, that is, the pointless statements that 
effortlessly circulate 24/7 through a global communication net­
work that does not block but incites expression. Or, to invoke a 
quite different although highly relevant point of comparison, con­
sider in what ways Blackstar, precisely as a tombeau, repeats the 
gestures of Chris Marker’s Le Tombeau d’Alexandre (F 1992). Made 
in 1992 this extraordinary study, perhaps even an homage, to 
Alexandr Medvedkin executes a carnival of parietal enfoldings—
the filmed interview with Medvedkin who emerges as the most 
unwatched yet influential Soviet director of the 20th century; the 
narrator’s skilful use of the second person to superimpose the 
audience and the subject; the staging of film viewings within, 
around, and before the tombeau and so on—all cryptic gestures 
that link the figure of the pure communist (the last Bolshevik) 
with the effect of a medium that races to say what it marks as 
unsayable. True, Marker’s preferred mask was that of the cat as 
opposed to “Button Eyes,” but his articulation of the tie between 
formal dysfunction and what we might call primary bolshevism 
traces a politicization of art that echoes in Bowie’s crypt. It is 
along this threshold, this lip, that Blackstar leaves us. As such, 
its gesture may be even more profound than Deleuze’s who, in 
reverently invoking the little gaps of silence and solitude, appears 
to be holding out for a dialogue that, even if possible, even if 
desirable, misses the point, namely that this dialogue is always 
8 Since I accept in principle the “failure to communicate,” it may seem feckless 
here to insist that I do not wish to be misunderstood. Just the same, my 
point above is neither dismissive nor therefore disrespectful. If anything, I 
am trying to swim against the torrent of often shallow yet distinctly hagio­
graphic praise that has followed in Bowie’s wake. And, not to put too fine a 
point on it: there is more to nothing than nothing. That ’s all.
47only our bluebird, not our blueprint. If Blackstar has the immense 
pathos that it does, it is because in sharing its crypt with us it 
points ahead to what will have to be very different if we are to 
pick up what everyone is not talking about. This is not God, this is 
not even a guitar god, this is the world communication dis­order 
that is happy to facilitate and monitor the endless buzz, espe­
cially now the buzz about it­self. Thankfully, on Blackstar we have 
something that overrides this buzz and gestures toward what the 
nothing we have not yet heard might begin to sound like. 
“I can’t give everything [whole note rest] away.”
I simply wish to thank several people who have kindly shared their reactions to 
drafts of this text or pointed me in the right directions: Jeanine Ferguson (with 
whom I first “experienced” Blackstar); Cesare Casarino, Barbara Engh, Carla 
Farrugia, Qadri Ismail, Kalani Michell, Anaïs Nony and Niloofar Sarlati. Thanks as 
well to the editorial group for their several astute hints. 
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John Mowitt
Tracks from the Crypt
David Bowie’s 2015 Blackstar has been under-
stood by critics and fans alike to have a certain 
valedictory status. For them, perhaps for us, 
it is a 39 minute and 13 second farewell. A long 
goodbye. My angle is different. By situating the 
Bowie/Renck collaboration on “Lazarus” in the 
context of a meditation on the question once 
asked by Georg Stanitzek, “Was ist Kommunika-
tion?” I consider the CD and the video as strate-
gies of reconfiguration.  
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